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Abstract 
A person whose privacy has been infringed upon through the 
unlawful, culpable processing of his or her personal information 
can sue the infringer's employer based on vicarious liability or 
institute action based on the Protection of Personal Information 
Act 4 of 2013 (POPI). Section 99(1) of POPI provides a person 
(a "data subject") whose privacy has been infringed upon with 
the right to institute a civil action against the responsible party. 
POPI defines the responsible party as the person who 
determines the purpose of and means for the processing of the 
personal information of data subjects. Although POPI does not 
equate a responsible party to an employer, the term "responsible 
party" is undoubtedly a synonym for "employer" in this context. 
By holding an employer accountable for its employees' unlawful 
processing of a data subject's personal information, POPI 
creates a form of statutory vicarious liability. 
Since the defences available to an employer at common law and 
developed by case law differ from the statutory defences 
available to an employer in terms of POPI, it is necessary to 
compare the impact this new statute has on employers. From a 
risk perspective, employers must be aware of the serious 
implications of POPI. The question that arises is whether the Act 
perhaps takes matters too far. 
This article takes a critical look at the statutory defences available 
to an employer in vindication of a vicarious liability action brought 
by a data subject in terms of section 99(1) of POPI. It compares 
the defences found in section 99(2) of POPI and the common-
law defences available to an employer fending off a delictual 
claim founded on the doctrine of vicarious liability. To support the 
argument that the statutory vicarious liability created by POPI is 
too harsh, the defences contained in section 99(2) of POPI are 
further analogised with those available to an employer in terms 
of section 60(4) of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (EEA) 
and other comparable foreign data protection statutes.  
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1 Introduction 
No good deed goes unpunished.1 
The common-law doctrine of vicarious liability, in terms of which an 
employer is held accountable for the wrongful acts or omissions committed 
by an employee, is controversial and much-discussed.2 The same holds 
true for employers' statutory vicarious liability.3 However, one area of 
vicarious liability which remains available for deliberation is the statutory 
vicarious liability in terms of the Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 
2013 (POPI).4 
The purpose of POPI is inter alia to promote the protection of data subjects' 
personal information.5 Moreover, POPI aims to provide data subjects with 
                                            
*  Daleen Millard. BIur LLB LLM (University of Pretoria) LLD (University of 
Johannesburg). Professor of Private law, University of Johannesburg, South Africa. 
Email: dmillard@uj.ac.za. 
**  Eugene Gustav Bascerano. LLB (University of Pretoria) LLM (University of 
Johannesburg) Advanced Certificate in Labour Law (University of Pretoria). Legal 
Advisor, Office of the General Council, University of Johannesburg. 
Email:eugeneb@uj.ac.za. 
1  Simpson and Speake Concise Oxford Dictionary of Proverbs 142. The author explains 
that this saying means that life is so unfair that one is more likely to get into some sort 
of trouble than be rewarded if one attempts a good deed. The saying has been 
attributed to American financier John P Grier, banker Andrew W Mellon and writer 
Clare Boothe Luce, but its ultimate origin is unknown. 
2  Lawlor Vicarious and Direct Liability 45; Le Roux 2004 ILJ 1897; Le Roux 2003 ILJ 
1879-1883; Millard and Botha 2012 De Jure 227; Mischke and Beukes 2002 CLL 17; 
Murray Extent of an Employer's Vicarious Liability 41; Neethling and Potgieter Law of 
Delict 389; Neethling 2011a TSAR 186; Scott 2011b TSAR 786-787; Scott 2011 TSAR 
135; Scott 2015 TSAR 623-640; Scott 2012 TSAR 541; and Smit and Van der Nest 
2004 TSAR 520-543. 
3  Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 622; Lawlor Vicarious and Direct Liability 45; Le 
Roux 2003 ILJ 1879-1883; Mischke and Beukes 2002 CLL 17; Murray Extent of an 
Employer's Vicarious Liability 41; Neethling and Potgieter Law of Delict 389; Le Roux 
2004 ILJ 1897; Smit and Van der Nest 2004 TSAR 520-543; Van Niekerk et al 
Law@Work 87; and Whitcher 2004 ILJ 1907. 
4  Statutory vicarious liability is where a statute imposes strict liability on one party for 
the actions of another. 
5  "Personal information" means information relating to an identifiable, living, natural 
person, and where it is applicable, an identifiable, existing juristic person, including, 
but not limited to (a) information relating to the race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital 
status, national, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, physical or 
mental health, well-being, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and 
birth of the person; (b) information relating to the education or the medical, financial, 
criminal or employment history of the person; (c) any identifying number, symbol, e-
mail address, physical address, telephone number, location information, online 
identifier or other particular assignment to the person; (d) the biometric information of 
the person; (e) the personal opinions, views or preferences of the person; (f) 
correspondence sent by the person that is implicitly or explicitly of a private or 
confidential nature or further correspondence that would reveal the contents of the 
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some degree of control over their personal information,6 thereby giving 
effect to the constitutional right to privacy.7 To ensure the safeguarding of 
data subjects' personal information held by so-called responsible parties, 
personal information must be processed in a responsible and lawful 
manner.8 POPI also provides data subjects with rights and remedies to 
protect their personal information from unlawful and irresponsible 
processing.9 Where a responsible party fails to process personal 
information in a lawful manner (in other words, in accordance with POPI), it 
may face the sanctions created by POPI to promote compliance.10  
Inevitably, in any organisation that consists of an employer and employees, 
the employer will be held liable for contraventions of POPI by its employees, 
because POPI regards the employer as the responsible party.11 Therefore, 
where an aggrieved party would traditionally have sued the employer for the 
infringement of privacy based on the common-law vicarious liability doctrine, 
there is now also the possibility to litigate based on the stipulations of 
POPI.12 In terms of section 99(1) of POPI, the data subject may institute civil 
action against an employer as the responsible party. Section 99(2) in turn 
lists the very limited defences which an employer may raise against an 
action brought in terms of section 99(1). 5 
                                            
original correspondence; (g) the views or opinions of another individual about the 
person; and (h) the name of the person if it appears with other personal information 
relating to the person or if the disclosure of the name itself would reveal information 
about the person. 
6  Section 2 provides for instance that the purpose of the act is inter alia to regulate the 
manner in which personal information may be processed and to provide persons with 
rights and remedies to protect their personal information from unlawful processing. 
Also see ss 5 and 11. These rights collectively provide data subjects with a degree of 
control over the flow of their personal information. 
7  Section 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, see also s 2 of 
POPI; De Stadler and Esselaar Guide to the Protection of Personal Information Act 1. 
8  Section 4 of POPI. 
9  Section 2(c) of POPI. For an exposition of the offences, penalties and administrative 
fines contained in POPI, refer to ch 11 (ss 100 to 109) thereof. 
10  Sanctions created by POPI include enforcement notices (s 95), penalties (s 107), 
administrative fines (s 109) and civil remedies (s 99). 
11  See the definition of "responsible party" in s 1 of POPI. 
12  S 99 of POPI provides for a data subject's right to institute a civil action for damages 
resulting from non-compliance with the act. The civil action for damages can be 
brought by a data subject or by the Information Regulator acting on behalf of the data 
subject. The employer's liability is strict because it does not matter whether the 
employer, or its employee, acted intentionally or negligently. When determining the 
quantum of the damages, a court will consider what is just and equitable and ponder 
compensation for loss (including patrimonial and non-patrimonial loss), aggravated 
damages, interest and the costs of suit. See De Stadler and Esselaar Guide to the 
Protection of Personal Information Act 90. 
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From a risk perspective, an employer as the responsible party is extremely 
vulnerable, and this article argues that the defences envisaged by section 
99(2) are too limited. In order to prove this point, this article contrasts the 
defences listed in section 99(2) of POPI with the defences to vicarious 
liability claims in three other contexts, namely the common-law defences to 
vicarious liability, the defence created in terms of section 60(4) of the 
Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (EEA), and the defences provided for in 
foreign data protection statutes.13 It is necessary to juxtapose the common-
law defences to vicarious liability with the defences available to an employer 
in terms of POPI, because a data subject may elect to base his or her claim 
against an employer either on the common law or on POPI. The reason for 
the comparison is to illustrate that an employer may in certain 
circumstances, escape liability for the delicts committed by its employee, 
while the limited defences available to an employer in terms of section 9(2) 
of POPI would make this virtually impossible. 
The article compares section 99 of POPI to section 60 of the EEA as both 
sections regulate the statutory vicarious liability of employers and outline 
possible defences. At the outset it can be said that there is a significant 
difference between the two statutes insofar as the EEA contains a 
mechanism for the employer to escape liability, which is not found in POPI. 
This is contained in section 60(4) of the EEA, which determines that an 
employer will not be held vicariously liable for the conduct of its employees 
if the employer is able to prove that it did all that was reasonably practicable 
to ensure that the employee would not act in contravention of the EEA. The 
fact that POPI does not contain a similar provision demonstrates that the 
accountability of the employer is too severe in the case of POPI. 
The comparative study uses foreign data protection statutes that contain a 
defence akin to that found in the EEA. In terms of these, an employer will 
be able to escape liability if the employer is able to show that it proactively 
took such steps as were necessary and practically achievable to prevent 
employees from contravening the law. POPI therefore surprises for the 
reason that it does not contain a similar defence. This is surprising, since 
POPI's provisions are to a large extent a replica of the provisions of Directive 
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
                                            
13  In particular, POPI is compared with the United Kingdom's Data Protection Act, 1998; 
the New Zealand's Privacy Act 28 of 1993; and the Australian Privacy Act 119 of 1988 
(as amended). 
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data and on the free movement of such data.14 This naturally raises the 
question of whether the failure by the legislature to include a similar defence 
was intentional or simply a laxity. 
To highlight the problems with POPI, this article uses an illustrative case to 
show the practical application of strict liability.15 
2 The concept of privacy 
2.1 Introduction 
The concept of privacy lies at the very heart of this discussion.16 Privacy has 
been defined as the right to be forgotten,17 the right to keep personal 
information private,18 and the right to be free from intrusions and 
interference in one's personal life.19 Neethling defines the concept of privacy 
as follows: 
Privacy is a human (or corporate) sphere of seclusion from the public, 
embracing all those personal facts or information which the person concerned 
has excluded from the knowledge of others and with regard to which he has 
the will that they be kept private.20 
Privacy evidently encompasses the right to determine the destiny of 
personal facts21 and the right not to have personal facts disclosed 
unlawfully.22 All persons have a fundamental need for some degree of 
privacy.23 A lack of privacy, or an infringement of privacy, may have negative 
                                            
14  Magolego 2014 De Rebus 20, 24. Also see Directive 95/46/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with 
regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data 
(1995). 
15  A detailed exposition of the penalties and administrative fines provided for by POPI 
falls outside the scope and purpose of this article. For an exposition of the offences, 
penalties and administrative fines contained in POPI, refer to ch 11 (ss 100-109) 
thereof. Instead, the focus of this article is limited to the civil remedy available to data 
subjects and the extent of the employer's liability in this regard (s 99 of POPI). 
16  Neethling 2005 SALJ 18. The author contends that "it is generally accepted that the 
concept of privacy is difficult to define because it is vague and evanescent, or 
amorphous and elusive, often meaning strikingly different things to different people". 
17  Google Spain SL, Google Inc v Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos (AEP) 
Mario Costeja Gonzales (Case No C-131/12 of 13 May 2014). 
18  National Media Ltd v Jooste 1996 3 SA 262 (A) 271-272. 
19  Woolman and Bishop Constitutional Law 2. 
20  Neethling 2012 THRHR 243. 
21  National Media Ltd v Jooste 1996 3 SA 262 (A) 271-272. 
22  Case v Minister of Safety and Security 1996 3 SA 617 (CC) para 91. 
23  Neethling 2005 SALJ 19; Universiteit van Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk 
1977 4 SA 376 (T). 
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effects on a person, whether mentally or otherwise.24 Therefore individuals 
have an interest in the protection of their privacy.25 
2.2 The common-law right to privacy 
Privacy is protected by the common-law principles of the law of delict.26 
Here, a delict would be "an intentional and wrongful interference with 
another's right to seclusion in his [or her] private life".27 In O'Keeffe v Argus 
Printing and Publishing Co Ltd28 the court recognised the right to privacy as 
an independent right of personality worthy of being protected.29 But how to 
determine which information about a person is private in nature?30 It is up 
to each person to determine for himself or herself which information about 
himself or herself is to be excluded from the knowledge of others.31 Before 
the enactment of POPI, scholars held that information privacy was a sub-
category of the right to privacy.32 
A person may inhibit access to his or her personal information and may 
prevent others from disclosing such personal information to third parties.33 
The right to privacy may be enforced by the actio iniuriarum, the actio legis 
Aquiliae or an interdict.34 The actio iniuriarum is used to claim satisfaction 
for the wrongful, intentional interference with the right to privacy, whereas 
the actio legis Aquiliae is used to claim patrimonial loss occasioned by the 
wrongful and negligent infringement upon privacy.35 To prevent an imminent 
interference with one's privacy, or to avert an on-going wrongful 
                                            
24  Neethling Law of Personality 29. 
25  Neethling Law of Personality 29. 
26  Roos 2007 SALJ 422. 
27  Woolman and Bishop Constitutional Law 3. Also see O'Keeffe v Argus Printing and 
Publishing Co Ltd 1954 3 SA 244 (C) 249. 
28  Also see O'Keeffe v Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd 1954 3 SA 244 (C). 
29  Roos 2008 PER/PELJ 62, 90.  
30  Neethling Law of Personality 30. 
31  Neethling Law of Personality 30. 
32  See Neethling 2005 SALJ 20. Neethling contends that "the constitutional concept of 
privacy is, on the face of it at least, also concerned with what can briefly be described 
as informational privacy". Also see Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 302. 
The authors argue that the right to privacy includes "informational privacy", which is a 
person's right to control access to and the use of private information. 
33  Neethling 2012 THRHR 244. 
34  See Universiteit van Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk 1977 4 SA 376 (T). 
McQuoid-Mason 2000 Acta Juridica 234. See also Roos 2007 SALJ 423. 
35  Roos 2008 PER/PELJ 93. 
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infringement, the aggrieved party may obtain an interdict against the 
offender.36 
2.3 The constitutional right to privacy 
The common law right to privacy is reinforced by section 14 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.37 Public policy and 
society's convictions and beliefs that everyone is entitled to his or her 
privacy are deeply rooted in the Constitution and the values that underlie 
it.38 Common law, insofar as it is reflected in public policy, is determined by 
constitutional values.39 Despite the fact that the Constitution reinforced the 
common-law right to privacy, traditional remedies afford only limited 
protection for an individual's personal information because they do not 
provide the data subject with active control over his or her personal 
information.40 Roos points out that the common-law principles cannot 
ensure, for example, that the data subject receives notification of the fact 
that his or her personal information has been collected or is being 
processed, or that he or she has the right to access the information, or that 
he or she has the right to update and correct incorrect information.41  
Prior to POPI, the Law Reform Commission deliberated whether data-
protection measures ought to be legislated or whether the regulation of the 
right to privacy should be developed by the courts.42 Four fundamental 
reasons spurred the Commission to enact POPI. Firstly, the conservatism 
of the courts, their aversion to developing and adapting the common law, 
and the infrequency of case law relating to privacy infringement meant that 
the development of the common law and the right to privacy would occur 
only incrementally. Secondly, drastic law reform can be best achieved not 
through the judiciary but through the legislature. Thirdly, many countries, 
especially European countries, possess adequate data-protection 
                                            
36  Neethling Law of Personality 254. In addition to the aggrieved party's common-law 
right to an interdict aimed at preventing threatening infringement or continuing 
infringement of his or her right to privacy, POPI now also gives the Information 
Regulator the power to issue an enforcement notice if it is satisfied that the responsible 
party has interfered or is interfering with the protection of a data subject's personal 
information. Such enforcement notice may require the responsible party to take certain 
steps within a specified time; to refrain from taking certain steps; or to cease the 
processing of personal information specified in the notice. See s 95 of POPI. Also see 
McQuoid-Mason 2000 Acta Juridica 257. 
37  McQuoid-Mason 2000 Acta Juridica 228. 
38  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) 333C-D. Hawthorne 2008 SAPR/PL 89. 
39  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) 333E-334A. 
40  Roos 2007 SALJ 423. 
41  Roos 2007 SALJ 423. 
42  Neethling 2012 THRHR 244. 
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legislation. And fourthly, the common law does not make provision for the 
cross-border flow of personal information.43 
Privacy has therefore always been respected and entrenched in South 
African law. In addition, the Constitution places a duty on the legislature to 
create legislation that protects personal data.44 Personal data, as a specific 
aspect of privacy, is now protected by POPI. 
3 The Protection of Personal Information Act (POPI) 
3.1 The purpose of POPI 
As was indicated in paragraph 2.3, the Constitution affords everyone the 
right to privacy.45 POPI's preamble recognises that section 14 of the 
Constitution provides that everyone has the right to privacy. Each person's 
right to control access to and the use of his or her private information 
conforms with the objective of POPI to promote the protection of data 
subjects' personal information when it is processed by other parties and to 
provide data subjects with some degree of control over their private and 
personal information.46 The right to privacy includes the data subject's right 
to have his or her personal information processed in a lawful manner.47 The 
notion that information privacy is a sub-category of the right to privacy is 
echoed in the definition of personal information as contained in section 1 of 
POPI, which determines that personal information means any information 
relating to an identifiable, living, natural person.48  
POPI's preamble states further that POPI's purpose is "to promote the 
protection of personal information processed by public and private bodies" 
while, according to section 2 of POPI, the purpose thereof is, inter alia, to (i) 
"give effect to the constitutional right to privacy, by safeguarding personal 
information …"; (ii) "balancing the right to privacy against other rights, 
particularly the right to access information"; (iii) "regulate the manner in 
                                            
43  Neethling 2012 THRHR 244. 
44  Neethling Law of Personality 271-272. 
45  Paragraph 2.2 above and s 14 of the Constitution. Also see the Preamble to POPI; s 
7(2) of the Constitution. 
46  See s 5 of POPI (Rights of data subjects) for a concise list of the rights of data subjects. 
47  Section 5 of POPI (Rights of data subjects). For a definition of processing see s 1 of 
the Act. "'Processing' means any operation or activity or any set of operations, whether 
or not by automatic means, concerning personal information, including – (a) the 
collection, receipt, recording, organisation, collation, storage, updating or modification, 
retrieval, alteration, consultation or use; (b) dissemination by means of transmission, 
distribution or making available in any other form; or (c) merging, linking, as well as 
restriction, degradation, erasure or destruction of information." 
48  Paragraph 2.2 above. 
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which personal information may be processed …"; and (iv) "provide persons 
with rights and remedies" if POPI is contravened. 
3.2 Responsibility for compliance 
The first condition for lawful processing determines that the responsible 
party must ensure that the conditions, and all the measures that give effect 
to such conditions, are complied with.49 POPI specifically assigns 
accountability for lawful data processing to the employer (as the responsible 
party)50 and holds an employer accountable for non-compliance with 
POPI.51 It is thus the duty of the employer, as the responsible party, to 
ensure compliance with POPI.  
Remember, although POPI does not directly refer to the responsible party 
as an employer, POPI does provide sufficient clues which allow the reader 
to arrive at this logical and inferential conclusion, such as the definition of 
responsible party.52 POPI defines a responsible party as 
… a public or private body or any other person which, alone or in conjunction 
with others, determines the purpose of and means for processing personal 
information.53 
Or the responsible party is the person who requires personal information of 
data subjects for a specific purpose and who determines how such personal 
information will be processed. 
In order to bring across a pivotal point upon which this article turns, it is 
reasonable to surmise that the responsible party to whom POPI refers will 
be an employer, since it is usually the employer who determines the reason 
for the processing of personal information. The decision-making authority 
associated with the responsible party's right to determine the purpose of 
and means for processing points to the authority which is inherent in the 
position of an employer.54 Furthermore, section 3(1)(a) determines that 
POPI "applies to the processing of personal information entered into a 
record by or for a responsible party". Employers would be more inclined to 
keep records of personal information and may even be obliged by law to do 
so.55 Therefore it is apparent, or at least conceivable, that in most instances 
                                            
49  Section 8 of POPI. 
50  Section 8 of POPI. 
51  Section 99(1) of POPI. 
52  Section 1 of POPI. 
53  Section 1 of POPI. 
54  Grogan Workplace Law 56. 
55  See s 31 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 (as amended), which 
determines that an employer must keep a record containing at least information on its 
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the responsible party will be an employer.56 Personal information processed 
by individuals for personal reasons or for household activity57 and which 
does not form part of the responsible party's records or filing system58 is 
excluded from the ambit of POPI. Finally, the said accountability condition, 
which holds the responsible party accountable and responsible for 
compliance with POPI, strengthens this argument.59 This familiar concept, 
in terms of which the accountability ultimately falls on the shoulders of the 
employer, is known as the doctrine of vicarious liability. By ascribing 
accountability to the employer, POPI creates a form of strict liability.60 
Moreover, POPI permits an affected data subject to institute a civil claim 
against the responsible party.61  
3.3 Lawful processing of personal information 
Personal information must be processed lawfully and reasonably so as not 
to infringe upon the privacy of a data subject.62 To this end, POPI requires 
that certain conditions or minimum requirements must be met.63 POPI also 
stipulates various sanctions, notably penalties,64 administrative fines,65 and 
civil remedies.66  
Section 73 of POPI specifically deals with interference with the protection of 
the personal information of a data subject and determines, among other 
things, that a breach of the conditions for the lawful processing of personal 
information will constitute a violation of a data subject's right to privacy. 
Failure to comply with the conditions of lawful processing will thus render 
the processing of personal information unlawful, thus providing the 
aggrieved data subject with a civil action for damages against a responsible 
party.67 
                                            
employees' names, occupations, time worked, remuneration paid, date of birth and 
any other prescribed information.  
56  Paragraph 1 above. 
57  Section 6(1)(a) of POPI. 
58  Section 3(1)(a) of POPI. 
59  Section 8 of POPI. 
60  Scott 2000 Acta Juridica 265-266 describes this as: "[t]he vicarious liability of an 
employer for the delict of his or her employee in an instance of so-called strict liability, 
or liability without fault". 
61  Section 99(1) of POPI. 
62  Section 9 of POPI. 
63  Section 4 of POPI lists the eight conditions for lawful processing of personal 
information. 
64  Section 107 of POPI. 
65  Section 109 of POPI. 
66  Section 99 of POPI. 
67  Chapter 3 of POPI sets out eight conditions for lawful processing. 
D MILLARD & EG BASCERANCO  PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  11 
3.4 Security safeguards 
POPI forces the employer to secure the integrity and confidentiality of the 
personal information in its possession and under its control by taking 
appropriate, reasonable technical and organisational measures to prevent 
the loss of, damage to, or unauthorised destruction of personal information 
or the unlawful access to or processing of personal information.68 This 
exercise is intended to be cyclical as opposed to once-off.69 The duty to 
establish and maintain sufficient security safeguards entails more than just 
technical and technological measures. It includes the duty to educate staff 
and others who are responsible for the day-to-day processing of personal 
information on behalf of their employer.70 Deciding on what is appropriate 
and reasonable is, however, dubious and dependant on the size and nature 
of the organisation.71  
3.5 Remarks 
Unfortunately, no security safeguard can ever be perfect.72 An employer 
may, for example, implement stringent security safeguards, constantly train 
its staff and implement compulsory security policies but still find itself 
accountable for the deliberate and obstructive breach of POPI by a 
mischievous or careless employee. Although the employer will be able to 
argue that it complied with its duty to implement appropriate and reasonable 
security safeguards as required by section 19 of POPI, it appears as if this 
will not protect an employer against a civil action brought by a data subject 
whose privacy had been unlawfully infringed upon, for the reason that 
section 99(2) does not list it as a distinct and separate defence. Despite the 
statutory defences available to the employer, no provision is made in POPI 
for the employer to avert the statutory vicarious liability in cases where the 
employer has made every effort to entice its employees to comply with 
POPI.73 The fact that an employer has discharged the onus placed on it by 
section 19 may perhaps be taken into account by the court as mitigating 
circumstances when determining a just and equitable amount as 
                                            
68  Section 19 of POPI. Also see Neethling 2012 THRHR 253.  
69  Section 19(2)(a) of POPI determines that the responsible party must ensure that the 
safeguards are continually updated in response to new risks or deficiencies in 
previously implemented safeguards. 
70  De Stadler and Esselaar Guide to the Protection of Personal Information Act 35.  
71  Although expensive, the ISO 27001 (international security standard) may in most 
instances constitute reasonable and appropriate technical security standards. 
72  This is most probably why POPI requires only that responsible parties implement 
"appropriate" and "reasonable" security measures. 
73  Section 99(2) of POPI. 
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damages.74 The next paragraph illustrates the deficiencies in POPI and 
shows that it leaves employees in an unenviable position. 
4 Illustrative case study: setting the scene 
4.1 Introduction  
For the purpose of argument the following fictional scenario will be used. 
The facts of this fictional case study will be applied to the common law, 
contrasted with the EEA, and compared to foreign data-protection statutes 
to illustrate the glaring inadequacy of the statutory defences available to the 
employer when faced with a civil claim brought by a data subject in relation 
to an infringement caused by an employee in contravention of POPI. 
Consider the following: Mrs A is an administrative assistant at a university. 
She processes personal information on students, such as grades, subjects 
and modules passed, etc. Since the inception of the first draft of the 
Protection of Personal Information Bill the university has proactively 
educated its employees on the impact of the pending Act, and in particular, 
the conditions for lawful processing and the general prohibition against the 
processing of personal information that does not comply with these 
conditions. Ever since, the university has been committed to complying with 
POPI. Efforts included frequently conducting educational and informative 
workshops, circulating newsletters and emailing circulars containing tips, 
instructions and guidelines on compliance. The employer also prepared a 
policy and a standard operating procedure setting out the institution's formal 
stance in relation to the lawful collection, processing, storage, retention and 
destruction of students' personal information. Moreover, the employer 
conducts thorough, continuous training of all employees. Despite Mrs A's 
familiarity with POPI, her employer's policy and standard operating 
procedure, and notwithstanding her training and her having frequent sight 
of an aide-mémoire of the level of compliance required of her, she is induced 
by a third party, company B, to divulge to it the academic records and 
contact details of the university's top students. One evening, while attending 
to her personal emails at home, she decides to accept company B's hefty 
bribe. The affected students consequently receive unsolicited calls and 
emails from company B, which mentions to the students that it received their 
information from a university employee. One particular student is outraged 
                                            
74  Section 99(3) of POPI. 
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at the flagrant infringement upon her privacy and decides to institute action 
against the university.  
The dissemination of the students' personal information by Mrs A to 
company B is in flagrant contravention of POPI and does not constitute 
lawful processing, as several conditions for the lawful processing of 
personal information have been contravened.  
4.2  Consent and justification 
Neither the student nor a competent person acting in the interest of the 
student provided the consent required for Mrs A to disclose the student's 
academic record to the company B.75 Consent is defined in POPI as the 
"voluntary, specific, informed expression of will in terms of which permission 
is given for the processing of personal information".76 The definition implies 
that the student's prior consent should have been obtained for the purpose 
of divulging her information to company B. It further entails that the student, 
in order to provide such specific consent, should have been duly informed 
of the purpose for which Mrs A intended to process it. The processing of the 
student's personal information was not necessary to carry out actions for 
the conclusion or performance of a contract between the university and the 
student,77 neither was it necessary to comply with an obligation imposed by 
law.78 The processing was also not done in order to protect a legitimate 
interest of the student,79 the university or company B.80 Finally, the 
processing was not necessary for the performance of a public law duty.81 
4.3 Compatibility with the function or activity of the employer 
Personal information must be collected for a specific, explicitly defined and 
lawful purpose related to a function or activity of the responsible party.82 
"Explicit" is defined as "stated clearly and in detail, leaving no room for 
confusion or doubt".83 Assuming that the university clearly informed the 
student of the purposes for which her academic record will be used (ie to 
confer a degree), the purpose for which Mrs A processed the student's 
                                            
75  Section 11(1)(a) of POPI. 
76  Section 1 of POPI. 
77  Section 11(1)(b) of POPI. 
78  Section 11(1)(c) of POPI. 
79  Section 11(1)(d) of POPI. 
80  Section 11(1)(f) of POPI. 
81  Section 11(1)(e) of POPI. 
82  Section 13(1) of POPI. 
83  Allen Concise Oxford Dictionary 412. 
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personal information was completely removed from any function or activity 
of the university. 
4.4 Compatibility of further processing with the original purpose 
"Further processing" involves the secondary processing of personal 
information for reasons other than the original purpose for which it was 
collected, but which nonetheless are related to the original purpose. It must 
therefore be in accordance or compatible with the purpose for which it was 
originally collected.84 Section 15(2) provides five factors which must be 
considered to determine whether further processing is compatible with the 
original purpose for which the personal information was obtained and 
collected. These are:  
(i) the relationship between the new processing activity and the original 
activity;  
(ii) the nature of the personal information concerned;  
(iii) the consequences of the new processing activity;  
(iv) the way in which the personal information was collected; and  
(v) the contractual rights and obligations between the parties. 
The purpose for which the personal information of the students was used 
by Mrs A is not compatible with the purpose for which it was originally 
collected by the university.85 
4.5 Authorisation 
Section 20 of POPI determines that: 
… anyone processing personal information on behalf of a responsible party… 
must— 
(a) process such information only with the knowledge or authorisation of the 
responsible party; and 
(b) treat personal information which comes to their knowledge as confidential 
and must not disclose it, 
unless required by law or in the course of the proper performance of their 
duties. 
                                            
84  Section 15(1) of POPI. 
85  Sections 10, 13, and 15 of POPI. 
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Authorisation by the employer differs from consent by the data subject and 
forms part of the employer's duty to implement sufficient security safeguards 
to secure the integrity and confidentiality of personal information.86 Only 
employees who are duly authorised by their employers to do so may 
process personal information on behalf of their employers. They should 
process personal information confidentially and only for official purposes.87 
4.6 Remarks 
Mrs A clearly contravened section 20. Her employer neither authorised the 
dissemination of the students' personal information to the company nor had 
any knowledge of its being disclosed to company B. Mrs A deliberately 
disregarded the obligation to treat the information as confidential. 
5 Common law action 
5.1 Introduction 
The common-law notions of privacy have not become redundant.88 The 
student whose right to privacy has been infringed may either base her claim 
against the university on her common-law right to privacy or on her statutory 
right as confirmed by POPI. This is evident from two cases which dealt with 
sexual harassment in the workplace, and although POPI is not concerned 
with the issue of sexual harassment the principle that a complainant has 
"two roads" to an employer's vicarious liability (one in terms of the common-
law vicarious liability for delicts committed by an employee and the other in 
terms of section 99 of POPI) is evident from the Grobler v Naspers and 
Ntsabo v Real Security CC cases.89 In Grobler90 the claim against the 
employer was based on the common-law doctrine of vicarious liability while 
in Ntsabo91 the claim was based on the statutory vehicle which provided for 
the statutory liability of the employer for wrongful dismissal.92 
At common law, a party who suffers damage can claim only against the 
perpetrator and only if he or she can prove a wilful or negligent wrongful act 
or omission on the part of the perpetrator that is causally linked to the 
                                            
86  Paragraph 3.4 above. 
87  Section 13 of POPI determines that personal information must be collected for a 
specific, explicitly defined and lawful purpose related to a function or activity of the 
responsible party. 
88  Woolman and Bishop Constitutional Law 3. 
89  Whitcher 2004 ILJ 1907. 
90  Grobler v Naspers 2004 2 All SA 160 (C). 
91  Ntsabo v Real Security CC 2003 24 ILJ 2341 (LC). 
92  Millard and Botha 2012 De Jure 231-232. 
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damage or personal injury. One exception to this rule is found in the doctrine 
of vicarious liability, in terms of which a third party is held accountable for 
the delicts committed by another.93 The party who suffers damage or injury 
need not prove that the employer acted wilfully or negligently.94 For this 
reason the employer's vicarious liability for the wrongs committed by its 
employees is regarded as strict liability since the employer cannot be said 
to be the perpetrator whose actions or omissions caused the damage 
complained of.95 There is also no causal link between the damages suffered 
and the actions or omissions of the employer. Consequently, both the 
employee and the employer are held liable, although only the employee 
might have been at fault and although the employer was entirely removed 
from the event.96 
5.2 Vicarious liability and the deviation cases 
The doctrine of vicarious liability, in its modern form, is motivated by 
considerations of public policy.97 Public policy demands that a person 
whose rights have been wrongfully infringed upon should not be left without 
a claim.98 Since employers, through their activities, not only create the risk 
of harm to others but also enjoy the profits resulting from the labour of their 
employees, employers should be held liable for the wrongful acts of their 
employees.99 For an employer to be held vicariously liable for the wrongful 
acts of its employees, certain requirements have to be satisfied, namely:100 
                                            
93  See Neethling and Potgieter Law of Delict 389. 
94  Millard and Botha 2012 De Jure 227. 
95  Millard and Botha 2012 De Jure 227. 
96  Loots 2008 Stell LR 143 - 169. The author points out that in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries the maxim qui facit per alium facit per se ("he who acts through 
another acts himself") was regarded as reflecting the view that the unlawful acts of 
one person may be attributed to another. 
97  Le Roux 2003 ILJ 1879. 
98  Le Roux 2003 ILJ 1879. 
99  Le Roux 2003 ILJ 1879. There is an array of theories that justify the doctrine of 
vicarious liability. See for example Neethling and Potgieter Law of Delict 389. These 
include: (i) the employer's own fault theory (see for example Feldman (Pty) Ltd v Mall 
1945 AD 733, where the court held that culpa in eligendo referred to the employer's 
fault in the choice of an employee); (ii) the interest or profit theory (in terms of which 
the employer must, together with the benefits and profits received from employing 
employees, also bear the losses occasioned by its employees' wrongful acts); (iii) the 
identification theory (in terms of which the employee is simply an extension of the 
employer); (iv) the solvency theory (in terms of which the employer is financially in a 
better position to carry the costs of compensating the claimant); and (v) the risk theory 
(in terms of which the employer should be held accountable for the wrongful acts 
committed by its employees since entrusting employees with work creates a risk of 
harm to others). 
100  See Calitz 2005 TSAR 216. 
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the existence of an employer-employee relationship;101 the commission of 
a delict by the employee;102 and the fact that the employee acted within the 
scope and course of his or her employment.103 
Whether or not the employee acted within the scope and course of his or 
her employment has been the most contentious and at times most difficult 
question to answer.104 An abundance of cases has illustrated the 
conundrum of differentiating between acts falling within or outside of the 
employees' course and scope of employment.105 No hard and fast rule 
exists.106 Generally speaking, employees act within the scope and course 
of their employment when they carry out instructions authorised by their 
employer, even when they perform the instructions in an unlawful 
manner.107 The problem occurs when employees do things that are contrary 
to, or deviate from, the tasks for which they were appointed. The true 
challenge in the correct application of the doctrine of vicarious liability is 
evident in the deviation cases.108 Despite criticism, the courts have 
recognised the possibility that one act may fall both within and without the 
course and scope of an employee's employment.109 In Feldman (Pty) Ltd v 
Mall the court held that the employer "may or may not, according to the 
circumstances, be liable for harm which [its employee] causes to third 
                                            
101  Smit v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 1979 1 SA 51 (A) 61-62; Gibbins v 
Williams, Muller, Wright & Mostert Ingelyf 1987 2 SA 82 (T). 
102  Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd t/a Rocklands Poultry v Rieck 2007 2 SA 118 (SCA). 
103  Scott 2012 TSAR 546. Also see Masuku v Mdlalose 1998 1 SA 1 (SCA); and Costa 
da Oura Restaurant (Pty) Ltd t/a Umdloti Bush Tavern v Reddy 2003 24 ILJ 1337 
(SCA). 
104  Scott 2012 TSAR 546. 
105  Loubser et al Deliktereg 392 indicate that the problem lies in distinguishing between 
the unlawful manner in which authorised work is performed, an unlawful act which falls 
outside the scope of the employee's work, and an act which involves the use of the 
employer's time or equipment but which is aimed solely at the advancement of the 
employee's own interests. 
106  See for example Viljoen v Smith 1997 1 SA 309 (A) where the employer was held 
accountable for the damage caused by its employee after the employee caused a fire 
to the neighbouring property by smoking while relieving himself. Also see Feldman 
(Pty) Ltd v Mall 1945 AD 733, where the employer was held liable for an accident 
caused by the employee with the employer's delivery vehicle, after the employee drank 
alcohol and collided with another driver en route back to work. Also see Carter & Co 
(Pty) Ltd v McDonald 1955 1 SA 202 (A), where the employer was not held liable for 
the damage caused by an employee who collided with a pedestrian when the 
employee rode to the market, on his own bicycle, for personal reasons. 
107  Loubser et al Deliktereg 389. Also see Costa da Oura Restaurant (Pty) Ltd t/a Umdloti 
Bush Tavern v Reddy 2003 24 ILJ 1337 (SCA). 
108  Minister of Safety & Security v Jordaan t/a André Jordaan Transport 2000 4 SA 21 
(SCA). 
109  Le Roux 2003 ILJ 1879. 
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parties."110 The court made a clear distinction between deviations that would 
amount to the employer's liability and deviations that would not.111  
In Minister of Police v Rabie112 the court applied the so-called standard test, 
which consists of a subjective and objective enquiry. The subjective enquiry 
considers the employee's intentions while the objective enquiry considers 
whether or not there is a sufficiently close link between the employee's 
independent acts for his or her own interests and purposes and the business 
of the employer.113 The employer will be held accountable for the 
unauthorised deeds of its employees provided that there is a sufficiently 
close link between the unauthorised deeds and the authorised deeds.114 
5.2.1 The disobedient employee 
An employee who acts in defiance of an express instruction, acts outside of 
the course and scope of his or her duties.115 In Bezuidenhout v Eskom116 
the court held that the employer was not liable where the employee, in the 
negligent performance of his tasks, caused severe injuries to another 
because the employee ignored express instructions. In this case the 
employee was employed to carry out repairs to electrical equipment. To 
enable him to perform his duties he was supplied with the use of a truck. 
The truck was clearly marked as the property of Eskom. The employee was 
expressly prohibited from giving lifts to anyone without permission from his 
superiors but he did exactly this and then caused a collision during which 
his passenger sustained severe injuries. In reaching its decision that Eskom 
was not liable the court relied on the dictum in SA Railways & Harbours v 
Marais117 that an instruction not to give lifts to passengers limits the scope 
of employment vis-à-vis the employer. Also, the subjective state of mind of 
the employee, in addition to the absence of an objective link between the 
employee's interests and that of the employer, could indicate that the 
employee's deed which caused the damage fell outside of the scope of his 
or her employment.118 Moreover, the court considered that the passenger 
was fully aware that the driver of the vehicle was prohibited from giving lifts 
to passengers and noted that where subsequent negligence in completing 
                                            
110  Feldman (Pty) Ltd v Mall 1945 AD 733. 
111  Mischke and Beukes 2002 CLL 17. 
112  Minister of Police v Rabie 1986 1 SA 117 (A) 134. 
113  Loubser et al Deliktereg 390. 
114  Loubser et al Deliktereg 391. 
115  Loubser et al Deliktereg 391. 
116  Bezuidenhout v Eskom 2003 3 SA 83 (SCA). 
117  SA Railways & Harbours v Marais 1950 4 SA 610 (A). 
118  Le Roux 2003 ILJ 1879; Neethling and Potgieter Law of Delict 389. 
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tasks within the course and scope of the duties causes damage to a 
passenger who has associated himself or herself with an action taken in 
defiance of an express instruction, the employer will not be held liable. 
5.2.2 Frolic of his or her own 
Employers often attempt to escape vicarious liability by alleging that the 
offending employee was on a frolic of his or her own.119 If the employee was 
engaged in a frolic of his or her own or did something which he or she was 
prohibited from doing for the purposes of employment, but which he or she 
may have been permitted to do for his or her own personal purposes, the 
employer will not be liable120 unless the act was incidental to the 
employment.121 
The problem cases relate to cases where the employee made use of the 
employer's equipment or property, but for the advancement of his or her 
own interests.122 In Ess Kay Electronics (Pty) Ltd v First National Bank of 
Southern Africa Ltd123 the bank was found not liable where an employee 
unlawfully appropriated bank drafts for himself. The court found that the 
employee exploited his position and opportunities to promote his own 
interests and "has also completely disengaged himself from the duties of his 
contract of employment …".124 
Equally, in Absa Bank v Bond Equipment Pretoria (Pty) Ltd125 an employee 
paid cheques payable to his employer into a cheque account of his own. 
Despite the fact that it was the duty of the employee to collect and deposit 
cheques on behalf of his employer, the court found that the stealing of 
cheques could not be said to form part of his duties. The employee went on 
a frolic of his own in order to promote his own interests.126 In Costa da Oura 
                                            
119  Le Roux 2004 ILJ 1897. 
120  Minister of Law and Order v Ngobo 1992 4 SA 822 (A); Ess Kay Electronics (Pty) Ltd 
v First National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd 2001 1 SA 1214 (SCA); Viljoen v Smith 
1997 1 SA 309 (SCA); K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 3 SA 179 (SCA); and 
K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 6 SA 419 (CC); Loubser et al Deliktereg 383-
396. 
121  Loubser et al Deliktereg 383-396. 
122  Loubser et al Deliktereg 389. In Bezuidenhout v Eskom 2003 3 SA 83 (SCA) the court 
found that the employee's act of transporting a passenger (who later sustained 
injuries) with the employer's vehicle contrary to express prohibition, did not fall within 
the course and scope of his employment. The employer was held not to be liable. 
123  Ess Kay Electronics (Pty) Ltd v First National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd 2001 1 SA 
1214 (SCA). 
124  Ess Kay Electronics (Pty) Ltd v First National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd 2001 1 SA 
1214 (SCA). 
125  Absa Bank Ltd v Bond Equipment Pretoria (Pty) Ltd 2001 1 SA 372 (SCA). 
126  Absa Bank Ltd v Bond Equipment Pretoria (Pty) Ltd 2001 1 SA 372 (SCA) para 6. 
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Restaurant (Pty) Ltd t/a Umdloti Bush Tavern v Reddy127 the SCA held that 
the employer was not liable where the employee, a barman, assaulted and 
injured a patron outside the employer's establishment. The employee was 
specifically required to treat customers with courtesy and respect and to 
refrain from getting involved in any incidents. Furthermore, the employee 
followed the patron outside the establishment after a disagreement had 
occurred. Although the assault was provoked by a disagreement which took 
place inside the workplace and while the employee was performing his 
duties, the court held that: 
[the assault] was a personal act of aggression done neither in furtherance of 
the employer's interests, nor under the express or implied authority, nor as an 
incident to or in consequence of anything [the employee] was employed to 
do.128 
In K v Minister of Safety and Security129 the applicant was brutally raped by 
three uniformed policemen. The Constitutional Court found that the doctrine 
of vicarious liability and its application conformed to constitutional norms 
and the state was held to be vicariously liable for the unlawful acts of rape 
by the policemen. Subjectively seen, the policemen pursued their own 
interests but, objectively seen, their actions were sufficiently closely linked 
to their employment because members of the public are likely to trust 
policemen with their safety. 
In F v Minister of Safety and Security130 a police officer on standby duty 
assaulted and raped a young woman.131 The Constitutional Court applied 
the two-pronged test as in K above, and found that the actions of the police 
officer were sufficiently closely linked to the operations of the South African 
Police Service (SAPS).132 On this basis the majority of the Constitutional 
Court held that the SAPS was vicariously liable for the delicts of the police 
officer despite the fact that the police officer pursued his own selfish 
interests and despite the fact that he was on standby duty at the time of the 
commission of the delict.133 
                                            
127  Costa da Oura Restaurant (Pty) Ltd t/a Umdloti Bush Tavern v Reddy 2003 24 ILJ 
1337 (SCA). 
128  Costa da Oura Restaurant (Pty) Ltd t/a Umdloti Bush Tavern v Reddy 2003 24 ILJ 
1337 (SCA) para 7. 
129  K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 6 SA 419 (CC). 
130  F v Minister of Safety and Security 2012 1 SA 536 (CC). 
131  The fundamental difference between the cases of K and F is that in K the policemen 
were on duty, while in F the police officer was on standby duty. 
132  F v Minister of Safety and Security 2012 1 SA 536 (CC) 550D-557B. 
133  F v Minister of Safety and Security 2012 1 SA 536 (CC) 557B, 557D and 557E-G. 
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5.3 Remarks 
In determining whether the employee acted within or without the course and 
scope of employment, the subjective intention of the employee is of 
relevance.134 If, however, objectively seen, there is a sufficiently close link 
between the employee's conduct and the employer's business, the 
employer may nevertheless be held liable even though the unlawful act may 
have been committed solely for the employee's own personal interests and 
purposes.135 Or, theoretically, the employer should be able to escape 
liability if the employee, subjectively viewed, promoted only his or her own 
interests and, objectively viewed, entirely disengaged himself from his or 
her contractual duties.136 
To return to the case study: Mrs A's subjective intentions were completely 
divorced from her employment duties at the time of the breach and she 
acted solely for the purpose of personal benefit and gain.137 The actions of 
Mrs A could be described as deliberate, self-directed, disobedient 
behaviour, and as a frolic of her own. At common law her employer could 
be held vicariously liable for her actions although they were committed 
outside of Mrs A's normal scope of duties since they could potentially be 
sufficiently linked to her employment.138 
However, in K v Minister of Safety and Security the court held that vicarious 
liability serves two functions, namely "affording claimants efficacious 
remedies for harm suffered" and to "incite employers to take active steps" 
to ensure that employees do not cause harm to others.139 This second 
function presupposes that an employer who is able to prove that it did in fact 
take proactive measures to motivate and incite its employees to act properly 
and honourably should be able to escape a claim based on vicarious 
liability. If there were no vicarious liability, employers would not be 
encouraged to minimise risks created in the course of business. 
Vicarious liability therefore incites employers to take proactive steps to 
ensure that their employees refrain from infringing the rights of others. An 
employer should therefore be able to escape liability if it proactively 
                                            
134  Minister van Veiligheid en Sekuriteit v Japmoco 2002 5 SA 649 (SCA). 
135  Minister of Finance v Gore 2007 1 SA 111 (SCA). 
136  Ess Kay Electronics (Pty) Ltd v First National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd 2001 1 SA 
1214 (SCA). Also see Mischke and Beukes 2002 CLL 17. 
137  Minister van Veiligheid en Sekuriteit v Japmoco 2002 5 SA 649 (SCA). 
138  K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 3 SA 179 (SCA); and K v Minister of Safety 
and Security 2005 6 SA 419 (CC). 
139  K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 6 SA 419 (CC). 
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promoted and demanded the lawful processing of personal information.140 
Furthermore, if the employer is able to prove that Mrs A ignored an express 
instruction141 not to breach the conditions of lawful processing, and that her 
actions were of a personal nature committed solely in her own interests, 
done neither in the furtherance of the employer's interests nor under 
express or implied authority nor incidental to nor in consequence of anything 
Mrs A was employed to do,142 the university should be able to effectively 
defend a common-law claim of vicarious liability. As stated in Minister of 
Police v Rabie: 
[A]n employer cannot be held liable if his employee performed an independent 
act, or acted for a purpose personal to the employee, or was motivated entirely 
by personal reasons such as spite or malice.143 
Apart from disproving the elements of a delict, the employer may, at 
common law, offer the following defences to a claim founded on vicarious 
liability: 
(i) that its employee deliberately defied an express instruction and acted 
outside the course and scope of his duties;144 or 
(ii) that the employee deliberately committed a dishonest act solely for the 
employee's own interests and purposes and such self-directed 
conduct is not sufficiently linked to the employer's business, thus 
falling outside the ambit of conduct that renders the employer liable;145 
or  
(iii) that the employee abandoned his or her work and engaged in a frolic 
of his or her own, doing something that that he or she was not 
permitted to do for the employer.146 
  
                                            
140  Neethling and Potgieter Law of Delict 389. See n 103 above. 
141  Bezuidenhout v Eskom 2003 3 SA 83 (SCA). 
142  Costa da Oura Restaurant (Pty) Ltd t/a Umdloti Bush Tavern v Reddy 2003 24 ILJ 
1337 (SCA). 
143  Minister of Police v Rabie 1986 1 SA 117 (AD). 
144  Bezuidenhout v Eskom 2003 3 SA 83 (SCA). 
145  Minister of Finance v Gore 2007 1 SA 111 (SCA). 
146  Ess Kay Electronics (Pty) Ltd v First National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd 2001 1 SA 
1214 (SCA). 
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6 Action based on POPI 
6.1 Introduction 
As stated before, POPI provides data subjects with rights and remedies to 
protect their personal information from processing that is unlawful.147 
Although POPI does not constitute labour legislation, it has far-reaching 
consequences for responsible parties who are employers, and just as 
certain labour legislation such as the Employment Equity Act (EEA)148 and 
the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OHSA)149 creates strict liability on 
the part of employers, so too does POPI create strict liability on the part of 
the responsible party who is an employer.150 By ascribing accountability to 
the employer POPI creates a form of statutory vicarious liability. This is so 
because section 99(1) of POPI, which deals with civil remedies, determines 
that a civil action for damages may be instituted against the responsible 
party whether or not there is intent or negligence on the part of the 
responsible party. The employer must ensure that its employees comply 
with POPI and failure by its employees to comply will render the employer 
accountable. 
Unless a data subject consents thereto, the selling of personal information 
is unlawful. Both the seller and the buyer of the personal information will be 
in breach of POPI: the seller for failing to obtain the data subject's express 
prior consent151 and the buyer for failing to collect the information from the 
data subject directly152 (and from failing to obtain the data subject's express 
prior consent). Where the responsible party is an employer, the situation 
may arise where, despite such employer's efforts to educate its staff in 
relation to the requirements of POPI and despite its attempts to regulate the 
lawful processing of personal information by way of policies, regulations, 
codes or standard operating procedures, it could still nevertheless face civil 
action where an employee wrongfully and culpably interferes with or 
infringes upon a data subject's right to privacy. In casu the student may elect 
to institute a civil action in terms of section 99 of POPI against the university 
on the ground that Mrs A, who is an employee of the university, unlawfully 
                                            
147  See s 2(c) of POPI. 
148  Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (as amended). 
149  Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993 (as amended). 
150  See s 8 of POPI. 
151  See s 11 of POPI (Consent, justification and objection) for the different justifications 
for processing personal information without the consent of the data subject. 
152  See s 12 of POPI (Collection directly from data subject) for the different circumstances 
that justify the collection of personal information from sources other than the data 
subject itself. 
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sold her personal information to company B. Any breach of POPI or any 
unlawful interference with a data subject's privacy will result in the employer 
being held accountable. According to Neethling: 
… this principle is really-self-evident and in line with the common law position 
that the person processing personal data can be … held liable – and thus 
accountable – for the wrongful infringement of privacy… .153 
It is therefore clear that POPI creates a form of statutory vicarious liability 
on the part of an employer in respect of contraventions of POPI by its 
employees. 
The responsible party must ensure that the conditions for the lawful 
processing of personal information and all the measures that give effect to 
such conditions are complied with at the time of the determination of the 
purpose and means of the processing and during the processing itself. Any 
unlawful interference with a data subject's privacy will render the employer, 
as the responsible party, civilly liable for the acts of its employees.154 The 
defences that the employer may raise are set out in section 99(2)(a) to (d) 
of POPI: 
(2) In the event of a breach the responsible party may raise any of the 
following defences against an action for damages: 
(a) Vis major; 
(b) consent of the plaintiff; 
(c) compliance was not reasonably practicable in the circumstances 
of the particular case; or 
(d) the Regulator has granted an exemption… . 
Applied to the case study, the defences contained in section 99(2) would 
not enable the employer to escape liability. The disclosure of the student's 
personal information by Mrs A could hardly be regarded as an act of God.155 
It is also clear that the student never gave permission for her academic 
records to be disclosed to random third parties with whom she has no 
relations.156 It could neither be said that compliance was not reasonably 
practicable nor that the Regulator granted an exemption.157 Apart from the 
above defences, the employer will be unable to avert a claim for damages 
brought by a data subject whose privacy has been infringed by the said 
employer's employee. To the employer's detriment, POPI does not 
                                            
153  Neethling 2012 THRHR 247. 
154  Section 99 of POPI; Neethling 2012 THRHR 247. 
155  Section 2(a) of POPI. 
156  Section 2(b) of POPI. 
157  Sections 2(c) and (d) of POPI. 
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recognise good deeds, intentions or aspirations as defences to a civil claim 
brought in terms of section 99. 
6.2 Comparison with analogous statutes: POPI defences 
inadequate 
An employer who took reasonable proactive precautions to avoid non-
compliance with POPI by its employees should be able to escape liability. 
Neethling agrees with this contention when he states that: 
… the wrongfulness of [an employer's] processing should be set aside if he 
took all reasonable steps to comply with the data protection principles.158 
There are in fact several other domestic statutes that determine that an 
employer who otherwise would have been held vicariously liable could 
escape liability by proving that it took reasonable steps to prevent a 
contravention of such statutes.159 It is the absence of the employer's effort 
to anticipate and prevent contravention of a statute that creates the 
employer's liability.160 Conversely then, it follows that an employer who 
constantly and proactively strives to eliminate infringement upon legislation 
should be able to escape liability. 
As alluded to earlier, comparable data protection laws of other jurisdictions 
contain similar provisions which allow an employer to avoid liability by 
proving that it took reasonable steps to prevent the contravention of such 
statutes. The fact that other domestic and foreign statutes make provision 
for such a defence while POPI does not supports the view that the liability 
created by POPI is too harsh and practically inescapable.  
6.2.1 South African legislation 
Both the EEA and the OHSA are examples of statutes that create vicarious 
liability on the part of an indifferent employer and also set out a number of 
defences. Section 60(3) of the EEA, for example, determines that an 
employer must be deemed to have contravened a provision of POPI if the 
employer has failed to take the steps necessary to eliminate conduct which 
does not comply with the EEA. However, if the employer is able to prove 
that it did all that was reasonably practicable to ensure that the employee 
would not act in contravention of the EEA, the employer will be able to avoid 
                                            
158  Neethling Law of Personality. 
159  See, for example, the EEA and the OHSA. 
160  See s 5 of the EEA, which stipulates that every employer must take steps, in advance 
(and proactively), to promote compliance with the Act. 
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being held vicariously liable for the contraventions by its employees.161 The 
notion here is that employers should have taken reasonably practicable 
precautionary actions prior to the incident.162 A claimant must also prove, at 
a minimum, that the employee, whilst at work, had contravened the 
provisions of the EEA.163 The enquiry is whether the employee, at the time 
of the contravention, busied himself or herself with the affairs or business of 
the employer while at work.164 
The OHSA equally determines that the employer shall be held liable 
whenever an employee of such an employer does or omits to do any act 
which would be an offence for the employer to do or omit to do, unless the 
employer is able to prove that all reasonable steps were taken to prevent a 
contravention of the OHSA.165 
6.2.2  Brief survey of selected Commonwealth legislation 
6.2.2.1 The United Kingdom's Data Protection Act 
Although POPI is comparable to the United Kingdom's Data Protection Act 
of 1998 (UKDPA),166 it parts from the UKDPA with respect to the limitation 
of the accountability of the responsible party. The UKDPA (and other 
counterpart foreign statutes) contains a mechanism for the employer to 
escape liability if the employer is able to show that it took proactive 
measures to prevent the contravention of the statute, whereas POPI 
contains no such provision.167 
The UKDPA affords an individual who suffered damage by reason of any 
contravention by a data controller of any of the requirements of the Act 
entitlement to compensation from the data controller for that damage.168 
However, the employer is not liable if it had taken such care as in all the 
circumstances was reasonably required to comply with the requirement 
concerned.169 Moreover, section 55A of the UKDPA determines that the 
                                            
161  Section 60(4) of the EEA. There seems to be an exception to this rule to the extent 
that the employer will be unable to escape liability for unlawful conduct in breach of 
the EEA by senior employees, since senior employees are often viewed as "the 
employer". The effect hereof is that knowledge of the contravention will be imputed to 
the employer and will defeat the use of the defence. 
162  Cooper 2002 23 ILJ 1. 
163  Piliso v Old Mutual Life Assurance Co (SA) Ltd 2007 28 ILJ 897 (LC). 
164  Whitcher 2004 ILJ 1907. 
165  Own emphasis. See s 37 of OHSA (as amended). 
166  Data Protection Act ,1998. 
167  See s 13(3) of UKDPA. 
168  See s 13(1) of UKDPA.  
169  Section 13(3) of UKDPA. 
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Information Commissioner has the power to impose monetary penalties 
against a data controller (the responsible party) if there has been a serious 
contravention of the UKDPA which the data controller knew or ought to have 
known could occur and failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the 
contravention. This presupposes that no penalty would be imposed if the 
employer proactively took reasonable steps to prevent the contravention. 
The employer's reasonable steps would aid in defending a claim in terms of 
the UKDPA. 
The vicarious liability created in terms of the UKDPA and the defences 
thereto are informed by EU Directive 95/46/EC. Article 23 of the Directive 
provides as follows: 
Member States shall provide that any person who has suffered damage as a 
result of an unlawful processing operation or of any act incompatible with the 
national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive is entitled to receive 
compensation from the controller for the damage suffered. 
The vicarious liability of data controllers is limited, however, by sub-article 
(2), which determines that: 
[t]he controller may be exempted from liability, in whole or in part, if he proves 
that he is not responsible for the event giving rise to the damage. 
6.2.2.2 New Zealand's Privacy Act 
Section 126(1) of New Zealand's Privacy Act 28 of 1993 (NZPA) determines 
that: 
[s]ubject to subsection (4), anything done or omitted by a person as the 
employee of another person shall, for the purposes of this Act, be treated as 
done or omitted by that other person as well as by the first-mentioned person, 
whether or not it was done with that other person's knowledge or approval. 
By virtue of subjection 4 the employer may be exempted from being held 
vicariously liable for the acts of its employees in a particular circumstance 
[i]n proceedings under this Act against any person in respect of an act alleged 
to have been done by an employee of that person, it shall be a defence for 
that person to prove that he or she or it took such steps as were reasonably 
practicable to prevent the employee from doing that act, or from doing as an 
employee of that person acts of that description. 
It is not unusual for the New Zealand Privacy Commissioner (NZPC) to 
exempt employers from being held vicariously liable for the deeds of their 
employees by applying the exemption passage found in section 126(4). In 
D MILLARD & EG BASCERANCO  PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  28 
one particular case before the NZPC,170 an insurance company manager 
followed the complainant into a retail store, following a near accident 
between their cars. In the presence of other customers, the insurance 
company manager threatened to endorse the complainant's file and made 
reference to and disclosed sensitive personal information regarding the 
complainant's past accident record. The NZPC considered inter alia 
whether the insurance company had security safeguards (including rules 
and procedures) to guard against the unauthorised processing of 
information and whether such safeguards were reasonable and practicable. 
The NZPC found that the company provided intensive training and 
resources on the NZPA to its employees, including an instruction manual. 
Moreover, the manager had not only taken part in the training but had 
facilitated discussions in some sessions. The NZPC concluded that the 
insurance company had not breached the NZPA since it had taken 
reasonable steps to ensure that the personal information it held was not 
disclosed unnecessarily or without authority of the company or data subject. 
In the light of the conclusion reached, the NZPC went on to consider the 
impact of section 126. Section 126(1) places the responsibility on the 
employer for any act or omission by the employee. However, section 126(4) 
recognises that there are limits on employers' liability for employees' 
actions. The NZPC regarded the defence contained in section 126(4) to be 
available to the employer under the circumstances. 
It seems peculiar that the South African legislature failed to make provision 
for a similar exemption clause in POPI. Just as in the case described above, 
Mrs A's employer regarded the training of its employees on POPI as a 
serious matter. The intensive training of employees, its policies, standard 
operating procedures, circulars and frequent newsletters would have, under 
New Zealand law (and the laws of other Commonwealth jurisdictions), 
constituted a sufficient defence for the university to escape liability. 
6.2.2.3 The Australian Privacy Act 
Section 99A(2) of the Australian Privacy Act 119 of 1988 (as amended) 
determines that: 
[a]ny conduct engaged in on behalf of a body corporate by a director, 
employee or agent of the body corporate within the scope of his or her actual 
or apparent authority is to be taken, for the purposes of a prosecution for an 
offence against this Act or proceedings for a civil penalty order, to have been 
engaged in also by the body corporate unless the body corporate establishes 
                                            
170  Privacy Commissioner Case Notes 16005 [2001] NZPrivCmr 17 (1 July 2001). 
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that the body corporate took reasonable precautions and exercised due 
diligence to avoid the conduct. 
Once again, the Australian legislature here recognises the importance of 
limiting an employer's liability for wrongful actions performed by its 
employees. 
6.3 Critical observations and remarks 
Considering the fact that Mrs A blatantly and intentionally contravened POPI 
(and clear instructions from her employer) despite being au fait with the 
lawful conditions of processing and the consequences of a breach, and 
bearing in mind that she did so for her own personal gain, outside the course 
and scope of her employment, one would imagine that her employer would 
be able to escape liability on these grounds. This is, however, not the case, 
since POPI does not recognise these realities as defences available to the 
employer. 
An employer who is determined to steer clear of expensive litigation will 
implement comprehensive policies and rules, offer constant training, pilot 
workshops and awareness campaigns, monitor the attitude of employees 
and the effect of the training, etcetera, in order to ensure that all employees 
are well informed of the employer's expectation of them. It is trite that in 
terms of the EEA (and foreign data protection statutes) an employer should 
be able to escape statutory vicarious liability if the employer is able to prove 
that it proactively took all reasonable and practicable steps to prevent a 
contravention of POPI. Such steps may include the identification and 
assessment of risks, the development of policies and the incorporation of 
rules into the employer's conditions of employment, to name but a few. The 
courts have recognised that employers, who do in fact act proactively, 
should not be held liable for the delict caused by their employees. Why this 
principle was not extended to POPI is dumbfounding. 
7 Conclusion 
7.1 POPI's glaring deficiencies 
POPI seems progressive and flawless. It gives credence to the 
constitutional right to privacy and provides mechanisms for holding those 
responsible for breaching the fundamental right to privacy, liable and 
accountable. It is widely accepted that POPI was based on the UKDPA and 
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the EU Directive on Data Protection 1995,171 which strengthens the initial 
supposition that POPI is the product of careful consideration. This initial 
inference is further strengthened by the preamble to POPI, which 
recognises that the legislature enacted POPI in order to regulate, 
… in harmony with international standards, the processing of personal 
information by public and private bodies in a manner that gives effect to the 
right to privacy subject to justifiable limitations that are aimed at protecting 
other rights and important interests.172 
The reference to international standards implies that the legislature had 
considered international conventions and precepts. However, upon closer 
inspection it is clear that unlike the UKDPA (and other equivalent foreign 
statutes) and the EEA, POPI does not provide for the protection of an 
employer who has done everything reasonably and practicable in its power 
to ensure that its employees comply with the requirements of the protection 
of personal information. The omission is so glaring that it seems to be 
deliberate. Nevertheless, one cannot help but wonder whether this omission 
was simply an oversight on the part of the legislature and whether, in time, 
the legislature will address the shortcoming. 
It does seem as if Mrs A's employer would have been able to escape liability 
had the student's action been brought in terms of the common law. 
Common-law defences might have aided the employer in proving that the 
actions of Mrs A were for personal gain and completely removed from her 
duties. 
As a result of the existence of POPI (and the limited defences available to 
the employer), the employer will not be able to avoid liability. There is thus 
a clear disjuncture between the statutory defences to a claim based on 
vicarious liability in POPI and those in other domestic statutes, and a 
pronounced disjuncture between the statutory defences to a claim based on 
vicarious liability in POPI and those in its foreign counterparts. 
The fictional transgression took place after hours, at the home of Mrs A. For 
the statutory vicarious liability to apply in terms of the EEA, the act or 
omission in question should have been committed "while at work".173 Had 
POPI contained a similar escape clause to that contained in the EEA, Mrs 
                                            
171  Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 
on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data (1995) 
172  Emphasis added. 
173  Murray Extent of an Employer's Vicarious Liability 41. 
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A's employer would have been able to escape liability for her contravention 
of POPI. 
7.2 Conclusion and recommendations 
The expression "no good deed goes unpunished" has never seemed more 
appropriate than in the case of POPI. POPI does not require intent or 
negligence on the part of the employer for the employer to be held 
accountable. Even employers who actively promote compliance with POPI 
and who campaign for absolute and unqualified observance of the 
conditions for lawful processing may be held accountable and liable. Neither 
the fact that the employee was expressly prohibited from committing an 
unlawful transgression in contravention of POPI not the fact that the 
employer proactively sought to avoid such contraventions, nor the fact that 
the contravention did not occur "while at work"174 would aid the employer in 
evading liability. It appears then that, as a result of the legislature's short-
sightedness, the only recourse available to the virtuous employer would be 
to make use of comprehensive (and costly) liability insurance to reduce or 
mitigate the risk of contraventions of POPI by its employees.175 Thus, the 
good deeds of the good employer will not be recognised as a defence. This 
position is at variance with that in analogous domestic acts176 that also 
create forms of statutory vicarious liability and that in corresponding foreign 
legislation.177  
A proactive and law-abiding employer will take all necessary steps and 
precautions to reduce the risk of expensive and protracted litigation and 
settlement orders. Unfortunately, POPI makes no distinction between the 
liability of a prudent employer and one who adopts a nonchalant approach 
to the duty to respect the privacy of data subjects. Both the virtuous and the 
indifferent employer are treated alike in respect of contraventions by their 
employees. Consequently, the good deeds of the virtuous employer seem 
to be of no significance. Undeniably, the law-abiding employer's good deeds 
will not constitute an acceptable defence against retribution in terms of 
POPI. 
In the light of the analogy with the EEA and the comparative study, it is 
submitted that an additional defence to a claim based on the statutory 
                                            
174  See s 60 of the EEA.  
175  Lawlor Vicarious and Direct Liability 45. Also see Smit and Van der Nest 2004 TSAR 
520-543. 
176  See, for example, the EEA and the OHSA (as amended). 
177  See, for example, the UKDPA; the NZPA and the Australian Privacy Act 119 of 1877 
(as amended). 
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vicarious liability in terms of POPI should be included. Such an additional 
defence should mirror the defences contained in section 60(4) of the EEA, 
section 126(4) of the NZPA,178 section 13(3) of the UKDPA,179 and section 
99A(2) of the APA.180 More specifically, it is submitted that section 99(2) 
should be amended to include the following wording, namely: 
Despite subsection (1), an employer is not liable for the conduct of an 
employee if that employer is able to prove that it did all that was reasonably 
practicable to ensure that the employee would not act in contravention of this 
Act. 
This simple addition would bring POPI in line with the legislation mentioned 
above and alleviate the plight of the employer without compromising any of 
the all-important objectives of POPI. 
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